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 Wittgenstein And 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‘Actual Infinity’ 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Lynn Therrien* 
Abstract 
In order to explain Wittgenstein’s account of the reality of completed infinity in 
mathematics, a brief overview of Cantor’s initial injection of the idea into set-
theory, its trajectory (including the Diagonal Argument, the Continuum 
Hypothesis and Cantor’s Theorem) and the philosophic implications he attributed 
to it will be presented. Subsequently, we will first expound Wittgenstein’s 
grammatical critique of the use of the term ‘infinity’ in common parlance and its 
conversion into a notion of an actually existing (completed) infinite ‘set’. Secondly, 
we will delve into Wittgenstein’s technical critique of the concept of 
‘denumerability’ as it is presented in set theory as well as his philosophic refutation 
of Cantor’s Diagonal Argument and the implications of such a refutation onto the 
problems of the Continuum Hypothesis and Cantor’s Theorem. Throughout, the 
discussion will be placed within the historical and philosophical framework of the 
Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik and Hilbert’s problems. 
1. Introduction 
The history of the concept of infinity is about as linear as the 
supposedly undenumerable ‘line’ of real numbers and Wittgenstein’s 
critique of the idea of the infinite touches upon an ‘infinity’ of these 
‘moments’. In the history of the development of a scientifically 
definable idea of the infinite, only the contributions of Aristotle and 
Kant have been as important as those of the German mathematician 
______________ 
* L'auteure est étudiante au baccalauréat en philosophie (Université de 
Montréal). 
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Georg Cantor (1845-1918). In proving the uncountability of the 
continuum of real numbers, he effectively founded Set Theory (i.e. 
the mathematical study of infinity) – a theory which he had hoped 
would provide mathematics with its ‘true Foundations’. Thus, in an 
effort to appreciate more clearly Wittgenstein’s oft maligned critique 
of the actual mathematical infinite1, we have chosen Wittgenstein’s 
commentary on Cantor and his Theory of Transfinite Sets to be our 
Ariadne’s thread ; in fact 
the problems posed by the mathematical theory of infinity 
founded by Cantor provide what might best be described 
as both the testing-ground and the touchstone of 
Wittgenstein’s approach to the philosophy of mathematics. 
Herein lies the juncture between calculus and prose, and 
thus, the confrontation between mathematics and 
philosophy2.  
Furthermore, we shall also filter the discussion through two 
sieves : a) Cantor’s notion of ‘infinite sets’ and b) Cantor’s ideas on 
denumerability and cardinality. In each of these topics, Wittgenstein’s 
contribution can be summed up as i- a grammatical clarification of 
mathematical prose ; ii- a conceptual elucidation of the relevant 
metamathematical underpinnings ; and iii- the dissolution of an 
outstanding mathematical problem through its passage into 
obsolescence. This will thus provide us with ample room to 
extrapolate Wittgenstein’s stance on actual and possible infinity in 
mathematics from his writings as well as the received literature.  
______________ 
1 Which in reality consists of a hodge-podge of jotted fragments mostly 
published posthumously. For brief speculations as to why Wittgenstein’s was 
(perhaps wrongly) reviled by his philosophical peers and mathematical 
contemporaries, as well as why this customary position ought to be revisited 
in light of the modern constructivist position as well as advances in 
complexity theory and the theoretical computer sciences, see Marion, 
M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, p. vii-ix. 
2 Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 161. 
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2. Cantor And The Mathematics Of Infinity 
The fear of infinity is a form of myopia that destroys the possibility of 
seeing the actual infinite, even though it in its highest form has created 
and sustains us, and in its secondary transfinite forms occurs all 
around us and even inhabits our minds. 
Cantor3 
There is nothing quite like set theory to make even the most 
skeptical mathematician wax eloquent. In general, it is widely 
considered to be one of the greatest achievements in mathematics 
and almost all of modern mathematics can be formalized in terms of 
the set-theoretical approach. As such, it is often claimed that set 
theory constitutes the very foundations of mathematics4. Set theory is 
the mathematical study of the infinite. Cantor has rightly been called 
the founder of set theory when, in 1872, he unveiled his first 
axiomatic analysis of the topology of the transfinite set of real 
numbers (ℝ). Cantor was led to his transfinite set theory through his 
fundamental belief that infinity is ipso facto mathematically 
comprehensible. In fact, the finite and the transfinite were similarly 
structured and he saw the transfinite sets as ‘reaching’ towards an 
immanently Absolute infinity (God), which he denoted Ω5. In this 
______________ 
3 Quoted in Rucker R. (1983) Infinity and the Mind, p. 46. 
4 Rodych, V. (2000), “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Set Theory”, p. 281. 
5 Dauben, J. W. (2005), “The Battle for Cantorian Set Theory”, p. 230-231 ; 
Ferreirós, J. (2004), “The Motives behind Cantor's Set Theory – Physical, 
Biological, and Philosophical Questions”, p. 62 and 68 ; Kanamori, 
A. (1996), “The Mathematical Development of Set Theory from Cantor to 
Cohen”, p. 6. As well, it is essential to understanding Cantor’s thinking on 
the infinite to note that he perceived mathematics, metaphysics and theology 
to be inextricably intertwined : mathematics is the language of God’s 
immanent reality. In this, he was philosophically heavily and self-avowedly 
indebted to Plato, Spinoza and Leibniz’s idea of monads (Ferreirós, 
J. (2004), “The Motives behind Cantor's Set Theory – Physical, Biological, 
and Philosophical Questions”, p. 59). It is of note that, for Cantor, each 
element in ℝ corresponds to a real ‘point’ on the ‘line’ representing the 
number continuum and, furthermore, he conceived the infinity of the 
continuum to be ‘given’ through experience (Kanamori, A. (1996), “The 
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section we shall briefly review Cantor’s major contributions to the 
idea of the actual mathematical infinite, with a special emphasis on 
those aspects that will later be taken up by Wittgenstein in his critique 
of the actual infinite in mathematics.  
2.1. The Topology ℝ And The Continuum Hypothesis  
A set is a Many that allows itself to be thought of as a One. 
Cantor6 
It was in 1874 that Cantor published his views on the existence of 
all of the real numbers7 as well as his first uncountability proof by 
which he determined via reductio ad absurdum that if one assumed that 
ℝ is denumerable (like ℕ) and attempted to establish a bijective 
function8 between ℝ and ℕ, then one is presented with a 
contradiction (given the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem9). In other 
words, no matter how ‘close’ on the ‘line’ the elements in ℝ one 
assigns to those in ℕ, there are always more elements between these 
                                                                                                 
Mathematical Development of Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen”, p. 3). As 
a result, he is generally considered a Platonist – finite experience of the 
transfinite guides us towards God’s immanently infinite reality, which we 
may then coherently reproduce through rigorous mathematical analysis. 
6 “Über Unendliche, Lineare Punktmannichfaltigkeiten” (1882). Cf. Cantor 
G. (1932), Gesammelte Abhandlugen mathematischen und philosophischen Inhalts, 
p. 204. 
7 In a paper obtusely christened “On a Property of the Totality of All Real 
Algebraic Numbers” – the property being the denumerability of the 
algebraic numbers – for his real purpose was to prove the existence and non-
denumerable nature of the transcendental numbers (i.e., all of the real non-
algebraic numbers) ! At the time, this was a very controversial position. For 
more information as to why Cantor may have purposefully downplayed the 
importance of his major discovery in favor of a more milquetoast 
presentation, Cf. Dauben, J. W. (2005), “The Battle for Cantorian Set 
Theory”, p. 225-227. 
8 That is, to place the elements in ℝ in a one-to-one correspondence with 
those in ℕ. 
9 This theorem asserts the completeness of the ℝ continuum – in terms of 
sequences of nested closed intervals – that is, that there are no empty 
‘points’ on the ‘line’ of real numbers. 
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two that one will have ‘neglected’ to assign. This was his 
revolutionary discovery of the non-denumerability of the continuum 
of real numbers. For Cantor, the non-denumerability of ℝ implies 
necessarily that there are more elements in ℝ than in ℕ – that is, that 
ℝ has a greater cardinality than ℕ10. But could he prove that the 
transfinite set ℝ is really ‘bigger’ than the transfinite set ℕ ?  
Impelled by his meandering on the nature and dimension of space 
and infinity, Cantor established in 1878 that ℝ″ and ℝⁿ have the same 
cardinalities as ℝ11. These investigations subsequently led him to 
advance the Continuum Hypothesis : all transfinite sets are either 
countably infinite or have the power of the continuum. In the 
notation of Cantor’s 1895-97 works on transfinite cardinals, the 
cardinality of ℕ is denoted as ℵ₀ and the cardinality of ℝ as ℵ₁, such 
that the Continuum Hypothesis is equivalent to stating that there 
exists no intermediate cardinality between ℵ₀ and ℵ₁12. All further 
developments in transfinite set theory can be seen as attempts to 
provide a definitive solution to the Continuum Problem – which to 
this day remains unresolved. 
______________ 
10 Dauben, J. W. (2005), “The Battle for Cantorian Set Theory”, p. 228 ; 
Ferreirós, J. (2004), “The Motives behind Cantor's Set Theory – Physical, 
Biological, and Philosophical Questions”, p. 54 ; Kanamori, A. (1996), “The 
Mathematical Development of Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen”, p. 1 and 
p. 5. By contrast, the set of rational numbers (ℚ) was proven by Cantor to 
be a countably transfinite set, that is, to be a set possessing the same 
cardinality as ℕ – despite the fact that one intuitively feels that there are 
more elements in ℚ than in ℕ. In fact, this is not so, for ℚ (like other 
transfinite sets such as the set of ‘all even numbers’, the set of ‘all the 
products of the number 3’, the set of ‘all the prime numbers’, etc.) can be 
placed in a bijective function with ℕ.  
11 Ferreirós, J. (2004), “The Motives behind Cantor's Set Theory – Physical, 
Biological, and Philosophical Questions”, p. 53 ; Kanamori, A. (1996), “The 
Mathematical Development of Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen”, The 
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2, n˚1, p. 4. 
12 That is, there is no intermediate gradation in ‘size’ between those 
transfinite sets of cardinality ≡ ℕ and those transfinite sets of cardinality ≡ 
ℝ. 
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2.2. The Transfinite Numbers, The Diagonal Argument And Cantor’s 
Theorem 
What I assert and believe to have demonstrated in this and earlier 
works is that following the finite there is a transfinite (which one 
could also call the supra-finite), that is an unbounded ascending 
ladder of definite modes, which by their nature are not finite but 
infinite, but which just like the finite can be determined by well-
defined and distinguishable numbers. 
Cantor13 
In order to support his Continuum Hypothesis, Cantor was led to 
posit the existence of transfinite ordinal numbers to account for his 
essential notion of the ‘well-ordering’ of all transfinite sets14. In 
188315, Cantor identified ℕ (or ℵ₀) with the least denumerable infinite 
ordinal number ω and further posited the existence of uncountably 
many countably infinite ordinals to account for the infinity of ways in 
which a countably transfinite set may be considered well-ordered : ω, 
ω + 1, ω + 2, …, ω + ω (= ω· 2), ω· 2 + 1, …, ω· ω (= ω2), …, ω3, 
…, ωω, …, ωωω, …, ε0, … ad infinitum16. And all of these transfinite 
______________ 
13 Cantor, G. (1882), “Über Unendliche, Lineare Punktmannichfaltigkeiten”. 
Cf. Cantor G. (1932), Gesammelte Abhandlugen mathematischen und philosophischen 
Inhalts, p. 174. 
14 Although he was only able to prove this of the countably transfinite sets. 
His postulate that uncountably transfinite sets (such as ℝ) were susceptible 
of being well-ordered was precisely one which proof eluded him, much to 
his consternation. As crucial as the notion of well-ordering is to Cantor’s 
system, a discussion of this topic unfortunately lies outside the scope of this 
paper. 
15 Published under the title “Foundations of a General Theory of 
Manifolds” (although often simply referred to as the Grundlagen), this work 
also contains a large section on Cantor’s philosophical and theological views 
on mathematics and the immanence of actual infinity. Cf. Cantor, G. (1883), 
Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre. Ein mathematisch-philosophischer 
Versuch in der Lehre des Unendlichen. 
16 The cardinality of ℝ (or ℵ₁) he identified with the first uncountably 
infinite ordinal ω₁. 
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sets, he claimed, were of the same size, they all were ≡ ℕ17. But 
Cantor was not done with infinity. In particular, he wished to 
determine the existence, nature and size of the ‘set of all sets’ : his 
Absolute infinite (Ω) from which he felt the finite and the transfinite 
received their structure. For that, he would need to determine what – 
if anything – lay beyond the continuum.  
Notably, in 1891, he published his second uncountability proof 
(the Diagonal Argument) which was the stone he used to prove the 
proverbial two birds : not only was ℝ non-denumerable through 
diagonalization18 of the elements in ℕ, but also that for any set S, 
there exists a power-set19 p(S) such that the latter has a greater 
cardinality than S. This was later to be known as Cantor’s Theorem. 
Specifically, all power-sets of countably infinite sets are uncountably 
infinite (that is, if S ≡ ℵ₀ than p(S) ≡ ℵ₁). Applied to uncountably 
transfinite sets, this theorem affirms that there exists infinitely many 
cardinalities20 (for if S ≡ ℵ₁, then p(S) ≡ ℵ₂, ad infinitum)21. Hence, if 
Cantor is right, then there exists an uncountable infinity of transfinite 
ordinal numbers (or, an uncountable infinity of countably and 
uncountably infinite sets) and a countable infinity of transfinite 
cardinal numbers (or, a countable infinity of infinitely big sets, each 
one infinitely bigger than the last) ! Already, one begins to get a sense 
______________ 
17 Dauben, J. W. (2005), “The Battle for Cantorian Set Theory”, p. 229 ; 
Kanamori, A. (1996), “The Mathematical Development of Set Theory from 
Cantor to Cohen”, p. 5 and p. 10. 
18 For an exposition of the method of diagonalization by which Cantor was 
able to ascertain that even a segment of the ℝ continuum contains more 
elements than in ℕ, see Kanamori, A. (1996), “The Mathematical 
Development of Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen”, p. 8. 
19 The power set of S being the set of ‘all subsets of S’, including the empty 
set and the set S itself. 
20 Or an infinity of sets each one ‘bigger’ than the last. 
21 In fact, between 1895 and 1897, Cantor was able to introduce an 
arithmetic of the transfinite cardinals that allowed him to establish that the 
continuum ℵ₁ (thus the size of ℝ, ℝ″ and ℝⁿ) was equivalent to 2ℵ₀ 
(Kanamori, A. (1996), “The Mathematical Development of Set Theory from 
Cantor to Cohen”, p. 9-10). 
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for the “giddiness [that] attacks us when we think of certain theorems 
in set theory22”.  
3. Cantor’s Metamathematics And The Crisis In The 
Foundation Of Mathematics 
No one will drive us from the paradise that Cantor has created.  
Hilbert23 
However, Cantor’s theorem also meant that there could be no 
actual/complete infinite set Ω24. Furthermore, from the well-ordering 
of a set, Cantor was not able to deduce the well-ordering of its 
power-set25, which did not bode well for Cantor’s fundamental belief 
that the continuum was well-ordered and therefore susceptible to 
infallible mathematical analysis. In 1900, Hilbert named Cantor’s 
Continuum Problem as the most important modern mathematical 
problem, and the consistency of the idea of ℝ as the second one. As 
well, in 1903 Russell published their respective opuses – which 
included their merciless visions of the logical paradoxes inherent to 
Cantor’s ‘paradise’26. 
What to make now of the transfinite sets ? Could they still be 
viewed as reaching towards Absolute infinity if one could not even 
coherently hypothesize its existence ? Had Cantor really rehabilitated 
actual mathematical infinity ? Or had he merely reified possible 
______________ 
22 Wittgenstein, L. (1989), Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 16. 
23 Hilbert D. (1925), “Über das Unendliche”, p. 170. 
24 Or, as Cantor resigned himself to put it, Absolute infinity lay outside the 
scope of mathematics.  
25 Kanamori, A. (1996), “The Mathematical Development of Set Theory 
from Cantor to Cohen”, p. 9.  
26 Ferreirós, J. (2008), “The Crisis in the Foundations of Mathematics”, p. 3-
4. The most famous paradox being Russell’s logical paradox viz. the ‘set of 
all sets’. This paradox had already been discovered by Cantor in 1896 but 
had not yet been framed in terms of a purely logical paradox. The 
contradiction lies in the idea of constructing a largest ordinal number 
(Burali-Forti’s paradox) or cardinal number (Cantor’s paradox). Wittgenstein 
had much to say about these paradoxes as well. However, we do not need to 
investigate these in order to grasp the portent of his critique of actual 
infinity. 
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infinity ? Could the ‘paradise’ he created be saved ? Thus, Cantor’s 
Theorem, as well as his general Theory of Transfinite Sets generated 
much controversy and many revisions. Platonists, formalists, logicists, 
intuitionists and constructivists presented warring philosophical views 
as to the true nature of mathematical ‘reality’, ‘truth’ and ‘provability’ 
– ultimately culminating in the great Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik (or 
‘foundational crisis in mathematics’) of the 20th century. Ultimately, 
this debate was never resolved but rather petered out as interest in 
the sub-discipline waned in the wake of Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems of 193127. 
 
 
4. Wittgenstein And The ‘Labyrinth Of Infinity’ 
I would say, 'I wouldn't dream of trying to drive anyone from 
this paradise.' I would do something quite different : I would try to 
show you that it is not a paradise -- so that you'll leave of your own 
accord.  
Wittgenstein28 
 
There is no need to go on any further in an elucidation of the 
history of Transfinite Set Theory to grasp the scope of Wittgenstein’s 
critique ; for, if Wittgenstein was right, then there shouldn’t have 
been any further history of the actual infinite in mathematics, there 
was simply no need for this Foundational Crisis. We shall now 
examine Wittgenstein’s contributions to this debate (as they 
specifically pertain to Cantor’s), without seeking to canton him in any 
particular school of mathematical thought (this approach being 
faithful to his aforementioned avowedly idiosyncratic philosophical 
style and rejection of academic ‘schools’)29. Specifically, we shall limit 
______________ 
27 Ferreirós, J. (2008), “The Crisis in the Foundations of Mathematics”, 
p. 11-13. 
28 Wittgenstein, L. (1989), Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 103. 
29 It is of note that any discussion of Wittgenstein’s views on anything 
cannot bypass his quintessential approach to philosophy as technical 
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our purports to those concerning Wittgenstein’s critique of the 
meaning of ‘infinity’ and ‘denumerability’, of Transfinite Sets, and of 
Cantor’s Diagonal Argument. 
 
4.1. The Infinity Of ‘Infinite Sets’ 
 It is senseless to speak of the number of all objects.  
Wittgenstein30 
To begin, Cantor examined the mathematical infinite through the 
postulate that the ‘topology’ of the infinite could be examined as it is 
given to human understanding : through sets31. Principally, Wittgenstein’s 
qualms lay in i- Cantor’s misappropriation of the colloquial use of the 
word ‘infinity’ to denote a determinate (or in principle determinable) 
quantity ; and ii- his dubious notion of ‘infinity’ as an entity that not only 
exists independently from the mathematician but that, furthermore, 
prepossesses quasi-physical attributes that render it susceptible to 
topologic analysis. These extrapolations will have obvious immediate 
ramifications on iii- the idea of the existence of ℝ as an infinite totality.  
 
 
                                                                                                 
pruning of philosophical ‘problems’ through grammatical and conceptual 
refinement. In fact, all of the critiques presented in this essay may be viewed 
as Wittgenstein’s attempt to elucidate the metamathematical ‘problems’ 
involved in Cantor’s Transfinite Set Theory through this method (Shanker, 
S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 
p. 167, p. 176 and p. 198). After all, “[philosophy] is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language”, cf. Wittgenstein, 
L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations, §109), and its “aim is : to teach you to 
pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to a piece of patent nonsense” (cf. 
Ibid., §464). 
30 Wittgenstein, L. (2010), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §4.1272. 
31 This is known as the ‘set-theoretical approach’. It is of note that Cantor 
marshaled Transfinite Set Theory explicitly as a means for providing a 
mathematical foundation to his religious metaphysics of the Infinite 
(Ferreirós, J. (2004), “The Motives behind Cantor's Set Theory – Physical, 
Biological, and Philosophical Questions”). 
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4.1.1. The Grammar Of ‘Infinity’ 
If you can show that there are numbers bigger than the infinite, your head 
whirls. This might be the chief reason [set theory] was invented. 
Wittgenstein32 
Wittgenstein bemoans the conflagration, firstly, of the grammar of 
the ‘finite’ with the ‘infinite’ ; and, secondly, of the colloquially 
‘infinite’ and the technically ‘infinite’. Firstly, the logical syntax of 
‘infinity’ is non-reducible to that of a ‘numeral’ : while the latter may 
serve as an adjective denoting a given quantity, the former may not33. 
“‘Infinite class’ and ‘finite class’ are different logical categories ; what 
can be significantly asserted of the one category cannot be 
significantly asserted of the other34.” For example, Cantor’s notation 
‘ω + 2 > ω + 1’ hoodwinks us into thinking that ‘>’ here means the 
same thing as in ‘n + 1 >n’ : to denote the relationship ‘is of greater 
magnitude than’35. And, secondly, it makes no sense to speak of an 
‘infinite totality’36 : it is a logical paradox – one borne out of the 
______________ 
32 Wittgenstein, L. (1989), Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 16. 
33 Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 183-184 ; Rodych, V. (2000), “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Set Theory”, 
p. 286 ; Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy 
of Mathematics, p. 165 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §138 ; 
Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, §38. This 
category mistake is the result of such vernacular misnomers that depict the 
‘infinite’ as being merely a gigantic unit of length, such as stating that ‘there 
exists an infinity of stars’ or that ‘the universe is infinitely big’, the way one 
would state that ‘Mary has 3 cats’ or that ‘this page is 1mm thick’ 
(Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, p. 463 ; Wittgenstein, L. 
(1975), Philosophical Remarks, §142 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, V, §19 and VII, §59). 
34 Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, p. 464. 
35 Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 172-173. 
36 A term, when pondered, that proves to be an oxymoron – exactly the kind 
of muddled philosophical pseudo-problem (“academic philosophy in sheep’s 
clothing : a pseudo-explanatory ‘theory’ having no redeeming applications to 
anything other than metaphysics”, cf. Steiner, M. (2001), “Wittgenstein as his 
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previous grammatical muddle. To illustrate this inkling, Wittgenstein 
offers the following paradox : “Imagine a man whose life goes back 
for an infinite time and who says to us : ‘I’m just writing down the 
last digit of π, and it’s a 2’. [...] This seems utter nonsense, and a 
reductio ad absurdum of the concept of an infinite totality37.”  
The positive term ‘finite’ is inextricably linked to the concept of a 
‘totality’ whilst the negative term ‘infinite’ is just as much to that of a 
‘boundless series’. In fact, it was one of Wittgenstein’s chief 
intentions to show that ‘infinity’ could not be divorced from the idea 
of the endless process. It therefore makes no sense to speak of ‘infinite 
numbers’ or ‘infinite sets’38 ! Although, properly, it may be asserted 
only of rule-governed series that they may be either finite or infinite, 
nevertheless even then “[one] has [...] a concept of an infinite series 
but here that gives us at most a vague idea, a guiding light for the 
formation of a concept39”, a mere sense that there is a process here 
that will not terminate. However, building on his logico-syntactical 
category mistake, Cantor derived from his idea mathematical 
operations that were logically impossible to compute, in an effort to 
                                                                                                 
Own Worst Enemy : The Case of Gödel’s Theorem”, p. 270) that 
Wittgenstein abhors.  
37 Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §145. Along this vein, an 
unsubstantiated joke is often attributed to Wittgenstein : a man overhears 
“..., 9, 5, 1, 4, 1, 3. Done !” “What are you doing ?” “Oh, just reading all the 
digits of π backwards !”. 
38 Lampert, T. (2008), “Wittgenstein on the Infinity of Primes”, p. 69 ; 
Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 180-183 ; Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the 
Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 175 and p. 197 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1975), 
Philosophical Remarks, §138-139 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, II, §45. By that same token, it makes no sense to 
say that a set is finite, for if a thing is to be a set at all, it will by definition be 
completed, hence, finite. For this reason, Wittgenstein thought that “[in] a 
correct language there must not even be a temptation of raising the question 
whether a class is finite or infinite. [...] ‘Infinite’ is not a quantity. The word 
‘infinite’ has a different syntax from a number word.” (Reproduced in : 
Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 164-165). 
39 Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §16. 
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discern a concept that is necessarily unfathomable40 ! This leads us 
right into the heart of Wittgenstein’s logical dissection of Cantor’s 
‘topology of infinite sets’. For this first category mistake is mirrored 
by a second one.  
4.1.2. The Concept Of An ‘Infinite Set’ 
 I have always said you can’t speak of all numbers, because there’s no 
such thing as ‘all numbers’. 
Wittgenstein41 
“The infinite number series is only the infinite possibility of finite 
series of numbers. It is senseless to speak of the whole infinite number 
series, as if it, too, were an extension42” : in fact, the main problem 
with Transfinite Set Theory is that, through its use of abstract 
symbolic notation, it conflagrates intensions with extensions – thus 
reifying mathematical objects that simply do not exist. A ‘set’ is nothing 
more than an abstract symbol for a list (‘extension’) generated by a 
rule (‘intension’). In the case of a transfinite set, then, the ‘infinite’ 
intension is simply a recursive rule for calculating certain kinds of 
results – one that does not have an ‘and then stop’ at the end. 
However, while the rule may not have a proper end, the extension 
cannot be considered infinite simply because the extension is 
precisely only what we have written down on the list, what we have 
calculated ; the law yields only the endless process, not the endless 
extension43. 
______________ 
40 It is amenable to a proper understanding of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on 
infinity to discern that his finitist assailment of infinity is not concerned with 
man’s psychological or epistemological ability to ‘seize’ infinite totalities but, 
rather, with the logical syntax of the word ‘infinity’ as well as its 
mathematical applications. cf. Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the 
Turning-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 164, p. 180 and p. 197. 
41 Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §129. 
42 Ibid., §144. 
43 Rodych, V. (2000), “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Set Theory”, p. 284 and 
p. 294 ; Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy 
of Mathematics, 167 and 183 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1974) Philosophical Grammar, 
p. 457 and 461 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §130, §142 and 
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For example, the ‘set of all even numbers’ is constructed by the 
recursive rule ‘add 2’ ad nauseam. Its proper extension is an 
enumeration : a list such as {2, 4, 6, 8, 10, ...}. This ‘set of all even 
numbers’ is not an actually infinite extension ; we could symbolize 
this set as ‘&’ but this would still not also constitute an actual infinite 
set – although we might delude ourselves into thinking it was if it was 
presented to us as a true premise in an argument that otherwise 
works. Seen through this example, it is easy to see how describing 
‘types’ of ‘infinity’ with abstract symbolic notation44 deludes us into 
thinking that we have arrived at an actual infinite extension when in 
reality there are “only finite mathematical extensions45”. The law is 
the potentially infinite series, but that doesn’t mean that there is an 
actually infinite series ; nothing in the actual 
extension/list/enumeration has so far been ‘revealed’ to be actually 
infinite – all we have is a recursive intension/rule/law46. Of course 
                                                                                                 
§157 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II 
§45. 
44 Such as Cantor’s transfinite sets (e.g. ℝ), transfinite ordinals (e.g. ω) and 
transfinite cardinals (ℵ), which all purport to describe or denote various 
types of infinity. Of course, Cantor also initially believed in an all-
encompassing ‘complete’ infinity : the Absolute, aka God (Ω). According to 
Wittgenstein, one ought to be wary of such abstract notations denoting 
various manifestations word-concept ‘infinity’, as they merely conceal its 
tenuous nature beneath a veneer of concretism. 
45 Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, p. 469. The rest of the 
shroud of authenticity comes through the deployment of Transfinite 
Arithmetic, an example of which being the aforementioned delusion that ‘ω 
+ 2 > ω + 1’ ≡ ‘n + 1 > n’. Thus, this abstract notation does nothing but 
artificially strengthen this view that mathematics is discovering the 
properties of the actual mathematical infinity when, in reality, it only “builds 
on a fictitious symbolism, therefore on nonsense”. Wittgenstein, L. (1975), 
Philosophical Remarks, §174.  
46 In fact, no mathematical proof could prove that there is an actual infinite 
series because “there isn’t a dualism of the law and the infinite series obeying 
it” ! Ibid., §180. Wittgenstein was led to his conclusions on the logical 
impossibility of infinite totalities and on the dichotomy between 
mathematical intensions and extensions partly through his many 
fascinatingly unorthodox musings on irrational numbers. Although a 
discussion of these lie outside the scope of this paper, it is certainly not at all 
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this has immediate ramifications on the idea of the ‘set of all real 
numbers’ (ℝ).  
4.1.3. The Existence Of The Infinite Set ℝ And Mathematical ‘Reality’ 
[We] can’t describe mathematics, we can only do it. (And that of 
itself abolishes every ‘set theory’). 
Wittgenstein 47 
This is so because, for Wittgenstein, “mathematical truth is 
created, not discovered48.” As such, there is no ‘real’ quasi-physical 
mathematical landscape that pre-exists Man, revealing itself through 
Set Theory. After all, mathematics is algorithmic, not descriptive 
metaphysics ; mathematics is the calculus49. For Wittgenstein, the 
main impetus behind the semantic and conceptual confusion at the 
heart of the metamathematical belief in the infinite set ℝ50 is a 
metaphysical one : it produces a pleasant impression, a “giddiness 
[that] attacks us when we think of certain theorems in set theory51.” 
                                                                                                 
hors-propos to mention that Wittgenstein believed : a) that there were many 
different kinds of irrational numbers ; b) that not all of these kinds of 
irrationals could fly under the banner ℝ ; and, most importantly for our 
purposes c) that there were not infinitely many irrational numbers in the 
specific sense that they formed a ‘gapless’ continuum. Cf. Marion, M. (1998), 
Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 195-199 ; Rodych, 
V. (1999), “Wittgenstein on Irrationals and Algorithmic Decidability” ; 
Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 183-192 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1974) Philosophical Grammar, p. 46, 
p. 471 and p. 473 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §172, §§180-
1, §183 and §186 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, II, §29 and §33, and V, §34. 
47 Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §159. 
48 Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, I, §168. 
49 Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 3-6 and p. 198 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, p. 368 and 
p. 468 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §159. 
50 The all-encompassing mother-of-all infinite sets, all other infinite sets 
(such as ℕ, ℚ or ℤ) being, at least theoretically, proper subsets of ℝ. 
51 Wittgenstein, L. (1989), Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 16. 
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As such, he was convinced that if this aura could be dispelled and the 
Platonic pretenses shrugged, the inquiry into the ‘Foundations’ of 
mathematics would lose all its appeal52. It is thus patent that, for 
Wittgenstein, there could no more metaphysically than logically be an 
infinite set ℝ53 – which solves the second of Hilbert’s problems.  
4.2. The Infinity Of The ‘Infinite Cardinalities’ Of ‘Infinite Sets’ 
The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can 
also be answered. 
Wittgenstein54 
In Transfinite Set Theory, Cantor’s Diagonal Argument is at the 
heart of his results about ℝ and is generally understood as proving 
the existence of uncountably infinite sets (a necessary condition of 
the Continuum Hypothesis) and, as a corollary, the existence of an 
infinite hierarchical structure of the actual mathematical infinite 
(Cantor’s Theorem). Here, Wittgenstein’s qualms lie in i- Cantor’s 
muddled idea of ‘denumerability’ and of what it means to be ‘non-
denumerable’ ; and ii- whether his famous Diagonal Proof truly 
proves that some infinite sets are non-denumerable, or that some 
infinite sets have greater cardinalities than others. This will have some 
consequences on iii- the Continuum Hypothesis.  
 
 
 
______________ 
52 Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 17-18 ; Steiner, M. (2001), “Wittgenstein as his Own Worst Enemy : The 
Case of Gödel’s Theorem”, p. 269-271 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1989), Lectures on 
the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 16 Wittgenstein, L. (1974) Philosophical 
Grammar, p. 469-70. After all, set theory has no intra- or extra-mathematical 
applications. Cf. Steiner, M. (2001), “Wittgenstein as his Own Worst 
Enemy : The Case of Gödel’s Theorem”, p. 269. As such, “(i)t is simply not 
really necessary [...] to conjure up the picture of the infinite [of the 
enormously big] for how is this picture connected with the calculus.” Cf. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1978) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §59.  
53 Or ℕ, ℚ or ℤ for that matter.  
54 Wittgenstein, L. (2010), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §6.5. 
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4.2.1. The Grammar Of ‘Denumerability’ 
The philosophy of mathematics consists in an exact scrutiny of 
mathematical proofs – not in surrounding mathematics with a vapor. 
Wittgenstein55 
According to Wittgenstein, “[it] should not have been called 
‘denumerable’, but [...] ‘numberable’. [...] For one cannot set out to 
enumerate the rational numbers, but one can perfectly well set out to 
assign numbers to them56.” In other words, it makes no sense to say 
that a set like ℕ is countably infinite, because it is not true that one 
can ever count them to completion57. However, we can set out to 
assign numbers to each element in the set, so long as we accept that it 
is a task that we cannot complete58. Hence, ℕ is numberable – but it 
is not denumerable in Wittgenstein’s sense59.  
As such, the converse term ‘non-denumerable’ has nothing to do 
with the concept of cardinality, or that of a ‘greater infinity’60. In fact, 
on this view, the idea of construing infinite cardinal numbers to 
account for the sizes of denumerable and non-denumerable infinite 
sets is rendered utterly incongruous. It is precisely in this sense that 
______________ 
55 Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, p. 367. 
56 Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, §15.  
57 The term ‘denumerable’ does indeed have the connotation that it is 
factually possible to enumerate the thing at hand, whereas the term 
‘numberable’ merely states that it is factually possible to assign numbers to 
the thing at hand – which turns it into the task at hand.  
58 Rodych, V. (2000), “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Set Theory”, p. 294-295. 
59 Wittgenstein proposes an alternate definition : “I call number-concept X 
non-denumerable if it has been stipulated that, whatever numbers falling 
under this concept you arrange in a series, the diagonal number of this series 
is also to fall under that concept”. (Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, II, §10). What this would mean, is that 
denumerable and non-denumerable are horizontal categories (much like ‘a 
priori’ and ‘a posteriori’ are kinds of knowledge in the Kantian system), not 
hierarchical ones (much like ‘animal’ and ‘mammal’ do in the Aristotelian 
system).  
60 Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 196-197. 
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Wittgenstein presents Cantor’s rapprochement of the transfinite sets 
with the transfinite cardinal numbers to be a particularly disingenuous 
brand of “hocus pocus61.” We shall now summarily investigate 
Cantor’s supposed proof of the non-denumerability of ℝ, assuming 
for argument’s sake that Cantor’s basic use of the terms ‘infinite set’ 
and ‘non-denumerability’ is cogent. 
4.2.2. ‘Benhind’ The Diagonal Argument And ‘Infinite Numbers’ 
The verbal expression casts only a dim general glow over the 
calculations but a calculation a brilliant light on the verbal 
expression. 
Wittgenstein62 
It is then Wittgenstein’s categorical postulate that Cantor’s 
Diagonal Argument does not prove either that some transfinite sets are 
‘bigger’ than others, or Cantor’s Theorem63. This is because being 
unable to place an ‘infinite set’ in one-to-one correspondence with its 
‘infinite subset’ does not have the kind of implications on magnitude 
that Cantor concludes that it does : it neither confers ‘non-
equinumerosity’ as it would for a ‘finite set’, nor non-denumerability 
(and it certainly doesn’t establish the existence of transfinite cardinal 
numbers)64 ! Rather, in establishing that the ‘real numbers’ cannot be 
placed in a series, the “proper purpose65” of the Diagonal Argument 
______________ 
61 Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §22. 
62 Ibid., §7. 
63 It is in this sense that Wittgenstein claims that “[it] means nothing to say : 
“Therefore the X numbers are not denumerable”. (Wittgenstein, L. (1978), 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §10) Where the non-denumerable 
is construed in the classical Cantorean sense of ‘is greater in cardinality than 
the denumerable sets – because this claim simply does not follow from the 
argument. 
64 Lampert, T. (2008), “Wittgenstein on the Infinity of Primes”, p. 69 ; 
Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 200-201. 
65 Steiner, M. (2001), “Wittgenstein as his Own Worst Enemy : The Case of 
Gödel’s Theorem, p. 269 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1978) Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics, II, §13 and §16. 
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ought to be that it proves that Cantor’s ‘real number series’ is simply 
senseless. 
Furthermore, the Diagonal Argument is nothing more than a 
constructive rule – that is, a rule for constructing certain kinds of 
numbers out of certain other kinds of numbers. It cannot generate an 
entirely different infinite set of numbers out of a first infinite set66. 
Thus, Cantor has only actually proved that he can construct a finite 
expansion through application of a rule-governed intension ; the 
constructive rule itself (even if infinitely applied) will never yield an 
infinite extension67 ! The Diagonal Method can thus prove neither 
that ℝ exists as a gapless continuum68 (and, by extension, it cannot 
support the Continuum Hypothesis), nor that there is such a thing as 
an infinite cardinal (Cantor’s Theorem)69. 
 
 
 
______________ 
66 Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 178-181 and 195-196 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics, II, §3. 
67 Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 199 ; Rodych, V. (2000), “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Set Theory”, p. 295-
296. 
68 For Wittgenstein, the concept of ℝ as a continuous, gapless entity, which 
we mention as a corollary, is borne out by a semantic and conceptual 
confusion (cf. Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of 
Mathematics, p. 209-210) : “[like] the enigma of Time for Augustine, the 
enigma of the continuum arises because language misleads us into applying 
to it a picture that doesn't fit”. (Wittgenstein, L. (1974) Philosophical Grammar, 
p. 471) : “[a] misleading picture : ‘The rational points lie close together on 
the number-line’” (Ibid., p. 460) ; “[the] picture of the number line is an 
absolutely natural one up to a certain point ; that is to say so long as it is not 
used for a general theory of real numbers” (Wittgenstein, L. (1978) Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics, V, §32), for “[the] straight line isn’t 
composed of points” (Wittgenstein, L. (1975) Philosophical Remarks, §172), 
the “mathematical rules are the points” (Wittgenstein, L. (1974) Philosophical 
Grammar, p. 484) !  
69 Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §33. 
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4.2.3. The Continuum Hypothesis, Cantor’s Theorem And Mathematical 
Reality As Constructive Proof-Process 
[Only] in our verbal language [...] are there ‘as yet unsolved 
problems’ in mathematics. 
Wittgenstein70 
This is because, for Wittgenstein, as mathematics is an algorithm, 
the only mathematical reality is in the constructive proof-process, not 
the result71 – “[our] suspicion ought always to be aroused when a proof 
proves more than its means allow it ” ; the Diagonal Argument is 
then a “puffed-up proof72” because, while it may be infinitely applied, 
the completed collection of all its results can never be called infinite 
in the sense that Cantor intended. Thus, both by highlighting the 
nature of the intension/extension double-helix and by questioning 
the putative link between the bijective function and equinumerosity at 
the heart of Cantor’s set-theoretical approach73, Wittgenstein’s 
grammatical analysis has the effect of an axe dropping on the 
concretism of the Continuum Problem and Cantor’s Theorem : 
Cantor’s Theorem is logically false and the Continuum Hypothesis is 
not an ‘unsolved problem’ but, rather, merely a nonsensical pseudo-
problem – which solves Hilbert’s first problem74. 
______________ 
70 Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §159. 
71 Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 158-162 and p. 171-173 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, 
p. 369-370 and p. 374 ; Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, II, §7. 
72 Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, II, §21. 
73 Shanker, S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 181. 
74 Rodych, V. (2000), “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Set Theory”, p. 293. We 
leave it up to the reader to discern for himself whether Wittgenstein’s logico-
syntactical obliteration of Hilbert’s first two major ‘unsolved problems in 
mathematics’ is convincing. It is of course of note that career 
mathematicians have historically almost exclusively either rejected or ignored 
Wittgenstein’s approach. Of course, some authors have conjectured that this 
reception has mostly is due to base misapprehension of his basic intentions 
(Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics ; 
Lampert, T. (2008), “Wittgenstein on the Infinity of Primes”). A special 
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5. Conclusion 
It’s almost unbelievable, the way in which a problem gets completely 
barricaded in by the misleading expressions which generation upon 
generation throw up for miles around it, so that it’s become virtually 
impossible to get at it. 
Wittgenstein75 
To sum up, Wittgenstein’s view of the algorithmic nature of 
mathematics is directly linked to his anti-Platonic and anti-Cantorean 
stance against the completed infinity76. As such, Wittgenstein’s 
position on the status of infinity in mathematics closely related to 
Aristotle’s ἄπειρον which holds that the infinite is intrinsically 
incomplete77. The logical syntax and conceptual analysis of ‘infinity’ 
therefore precludes any technical use other than as an adjective 
putatively describing a potentially infinite mathematical process – the 
possibility of constructing infinitely many series through the 
deployment of a recursive rule78. Of course, the term ‘possible’ is 
ambiguous : it purveys the connotation that what is ‘possible’ can 
become ‘actual’, given enough time79 ; it is “one of the most deep 
rooted mistakes of philosophy to see possibility as a shadow of 
reality80.” Thus, in order to shrug off any pretense of an actual 
                                                                                                 
mention goes here to Daesuk Han for rigorously arguing that the ‘extension’ 
of the ‘real numbers’ is indeed a “homeless fiction” that has no application 
either inside the actual practice of the calculus, or outside (as a ‘support’ to 
real analysis). Cf. Han, D. (2010), “Wittgenstein and the Real Numbers”. 
75 Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, p. 466. 
76 Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 14 ; Steiner, M. (2001), “Wittgenstein as his Own Worst Enemy : The 
Case of Gödel’s Theorem”, p. 269. 
77 Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics, 
p. 181-183. 
78 Lampert, T. (2008), “Wittgenstein on the Infinity of Primes”, p. 69 ; 
Rodych, V. (2000), “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Set Theory”, p. 290 ; Shanker, 
S. G. (1987), Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 
p. 197-198. 
79 Wittgenstein, L. (1975), Philosophical Remarks, §141. 
80 Wittgenstein, L. (1974), Philosophical Grammar, p. 283. 
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extensional doppelganger to each possible infinite rule : “[the] word 
infinite ought to be avoided in mathematics81.”  
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